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Are CEOs’ attitudes and beliefs linked to their fims’ innovative performance? This paper uses Malmendier
and Tate’s measure of overconfidence, based on CEO stock-option exercise, to study the relationship
between a CEO’s “revealed beliefs” about future performance and standard measures of corporate
innovation. We begin by developing a career concern model where CEOs innovate to provide evidence
of their ability. The model predicts that overconfident CEOs, who underestimate the probability of
failure, are more likely to pursue innovation, and that this effect is larger in more competitive industries.
We test these predictions on a panel of large publicly traded firms for the years 1980 to 1994. We
￿nd a robust positive association between overconfidence and citation-weighted patent counts in both
cross-sectional and fixed-effect models. This effect is larger in more competitive industries. Our results
suggest that overconfident CEOs are more likely to taketheir firms in a new technological direction.
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Overcondence is at odds with standard economic models, which assume that beliefs are correct
on average. However, a large body of evidence from applied psychology shows that individuals
routinely over-estimate their ability (Svenson, 1981; Cooper et al., 1988). While much of this
evidence comes from surveys and lab experiments, there is growing interest in measuring the
impact of overcondence in the eld (DellaVigna, 2008). This paper uses a novel measure of
CEO overcondence developed by Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2010) to study
the relationship between managerial overcondence and corporate innovation.
Prior innovation research has typically invoked overcondence to explain persistence in the
face of long odds, often among entrepreneurs. For instance, Astebro (2003) and Lowe and
Ziedonis (2006) ask whether overcondence is needed to rationalize entrepreneurial behavior,
while Arabsheibani et al. (2000) and Simon and Houghton (2003) use survey data to directly
assess entrepreneurial condence levels. Our study departs from this tradition in two important
ways. First, we consider the role of overcondence at the opposite end of the rm-size distribu-
tion, among CEOs of large publicly traded companies. And second, instead of asking whether
latent overcondence is required to rationalize observed behavior, we examine the correlation
between a novel measure of overcondence and rm-level innovative performance.
We argue that for large-rm CEOs, the link between overcondence and innovation does not
reect unreasonable persistence, but rather the propensity to instigate major shifts in strategic
direction. And to make this idea precise, we propose a simple career concern model where
CEOs decide whether or not to innovate. In this model, successful innovation is rewarded
because it reveals new information about managerial ability. However, innovation is also risky:
when innovation fails, the market will infer that a CEO lacks talent, and they may be red.
Overcondent CEOs underestimate the likelihood of failure, and are therefore more likely to
innovate. This eect is larger in more competitive industries, where success reveals more
information about CEO ability, leading to a large payo that overcondent CEOs are eager to
capture.
To test these predictions, we combine standard measures of innovation, based on US patent
data, with a measure of CEO overcondence developed in a series of papers by Malmendier
and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008, 2010). The measure is constructed by using CEOs' personal
investments to capture \revealed beliefs" about their rms' future performance. Specically,
CEOs are classied as overcondent if they hold highly in-the-money stock options after they
are fully vested. Our panel data regressions are based on a sample of 290 rms and 627 CEOs
during the period 1980 to 1994. These are large rms, primarily from manufacturing and
technology industries, where we observe signicant patenting.
2Our main result shows that the arrival of an overcondent CEO is correlated with a 25 to
35 percent increase in citation-weighted patent counts (i.e. citations received by patents led
in a given year). The eect is larger if we assume that a CEO only becomes overcondent
after failing to exercise in-the-money option grants, instead of treating overcondence as a
permanent trait. We consider several outcome variables, and nd that overcondence produces
similar-sized eects for unweighted patent counts, R&D expenditure and citations per issued
patent. Interacting overcondence with industry-level measures of competition reveals that
this eect is larger when product market competition is more intense.
We extend these main results in several directions. First, we examine the link between
overcondence and two measures of innovative direction, based on the Hall, Jae and Trajten-
berg (2001) measure of patent originality and a new measure based on self-citation rates. The
results suggest that overcondence leads to a change in direction, and not just an increase in
R&D spending and productivity. Second, we show that the link between overcondence and
innovation is stronger for CEOs who are less constrained. Specically, the overcondence eect
is larger when a CEO also holds the titles of Chairman and President, or the rm has greater
cash ows. These two ndings strengthen our preferred interpretation of the main results by
showing that overcondence is more salient when a CEO has greater exibility to make changes
in their rm's strategic direction. Finally, we address the possibility of endogenous matching
between rms and CEOs by estimating a model that isolates the impact of within-rm switch-
ing from a non-overcondent to an overcondent CEO, and showing that there is no evidence
of unusual trends in innovative performance prior to the switch.
Overall, these ndings are consistent with theories that predict overcondence will lead
to greater exploration and risk-taking (Bernardo and Welch 2001, Goel and Thakor 2008).
This behavior generates positive information externalities, and will benet shareholders who
can bear risk more easily than CEOs. Thus, our ndings may help to explain the prevalence
of CEO overcondence, in spite of the tendency for these executives to destroy value through
unprotable mergers and sub-optimal investment behavior (Malmandier and Tate 2005a, 2005b,
2008, 2010).
1.1 Related Literature
Psychologists have provided a wealth of evidence that individuals over-estimate their own
ability. For example, most of us report above the median driving skills (Svenson, 1981), a better
than average ability to solve trivia quizzes (Moore and Cain, 2007), and a very good chance
of getting the job we desire (Weinstein, 1980). CEOs and other high-ranking executives may
be particularly susceptible to this bias, since overcondence is stronger among highly skilled
3individuals (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999), and when the link between actions and outcomes is
complex Moore and Kim (2003).
Given the uncertainty and complexity associated with research and development, we might
expect overcondence to play an important role in the innovation process. In fact, there have
been many studies of entrepreneurial overcondence (see Shane 2003, pg. 12 for a review).
But this literature has little to say about psychological biases among large-rm managers,
and typically emphasizes the existence of overcondence rather than its practical eects. We
suggest that overcondence may be important at both large and small rms, and attempt
to measure its eect on innovative performance directly. In doing so, we contribute to an
emerging literature at the intersection of industrial organization and behavioral economics (see
Camerer and Malmendier (2007) for a survey) that has already shown how behavioral biases
can inuence pricing (DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2006); entry decisions(Goldfarb and Xiao,
2009); labour productivity (Bandiera et al., 2005); bidding in auctions(Brown et al., 2009); and
union negotiations (Krueger and Mas, 2004).
Our study builds upon three broad streams of research. First, the data and measure of
overcondence come from Malmendier and Tate (2005a, 2005b, 2008,2010), who use it to study
corporate nance. Their key insight is that a CEO's personal nancial decisions | specically,
whether they exercise fully vested stock options that are highly in-the-money | can be used to
infer beliefs about future performance. As described below, Malmendier and Tate do extensive
work to validate this measure, and use it to show that overcondent CEOs are more sensitive
to cash ows (Malmendier and Tate, 2005a) and more likely to do mergers and acquisitions
(Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Ben David, Harvey and Campbell (2007) use an alternative
measure of mis-calibrated expectations and nd similar eects on corporate nancial decision-
making. Closer to our work is the study by Hirshleifer et al. (2010), who independently look
at the correlation between options- and press-based measures of overcondence and various
measures of risk taking, including patenting and stock-return volatility.
We also build on a long line of research that uses patents to measure corporate innovation.
Pakes and Griliches (1980) were the rst to estimate a patent production function, and their
model was extended by and Hausman, Hall and Griliches (1984), and Blundell, Grith and
Van Reenen (1999). This approach has been used to study the eects of competition (Aghion,
Bloom, Blundell, Grith and Howitt, 1995), R&D spillovers (Bloom, Schankerman and Van-
Reenen, 2009), and the strengthening of intellectual property protection (Hall and Ziedonis,
2001). Within this literature, our work is closely related to papers that emphasize corporate
governance and stock-based compensation, such as Lerner and Wulf (2006), who study the link
between innovation and incentive compensation for R&D managers, or Aghion, Van Reenen
and Zingales (2009), who examine the link between institutional shareholding and innovation.
4Finally, our paper adds to a small literature that uses asymmetric beliefs to model the
innovation process. In Klepper and Thompson (2007, 2010), asymmetric beliefs about the
potential of a new technology lead to spin-outs, whereby entrepreneurs leave incumbent rms
to work on a new idea. In our model, an overcondent CEO disagrees with the market's
assessment of their ability, and expects to be rewarded if successful innovation persuades the
market otherwise. Thus, although we focus on innovation in general, and not the process that
gives birth to specic lines of research, both models suggest that innovation can emerge as a
response to dierences in opinion.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and
the empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the data, measures of overcondence and our
econometric framework. Section 4 describes the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
2 A Model of Overcondence and Innovation
Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2009) extend the Holmstrom (1982) career concern model
by allowing the manager to innovate in order to provide evidence of their ability. In this section,
we develop a variant of their framework in which we introduce managerial overcondence.





 > 0) is unknown to the market, and to the CEO. The market's prior beliefs about CEO
ability are:














where 0  o  1 captures CEO overcondence. When o = 0 the market and the CEO share
prior beliefs, when o > 0 the CEO thinks that the market underestimates his expected talent.
This belief structure is common knowledge.1
In period 1, the CEO chooses whether or not to innovate, where the innovation strategy
is denoted by i 2 f0;1g. One might think of this as a choice between taking the rm in a
1See Aumann (1976), Morris (1995) and Yildiz (2004) for a discussion of the role of common priors in economic
models. In particular, there is no inconsistency in combining rationality assumptions and heterogenous beliefs
because these two assumptions are not related.
5new direction, which leads a broad increase in exploration, versus sticking with an established
strategy. If the CEO does not innovate (i = 0) the revenue realization is equal to zero and no
information is revealed about the CEO's ability. If the CEO does innovate (i = 1), he incurs
an innovation cost, I, and the period 1 revenue realization is equal to:
y1 =
(
1 with probability p
0 with probability 1   p
if  =  and it is equal to
y1 =
(
1 with probability p
0 with probability 1   p
if the ability is low.
We dene   1    where  is a measure of product market competition so that the
dierence in ability is more pronounced when competition is intense.2 The term  can be
interpreted as a reduced form of an un-modeled race in which a patent is awarded to the best
idea in a technology eld. The greater the degree of competition, the lower the likelihood that
CEOs with low ability will be able to come up with innovations that are superior to those of
the competitors.3
Following Holmstrom (1982), we assume that the CEO operates in a fully competitive
market, and that the second period income of the CEO is equal to the market perception of
his expected ability, conditional on the information acquired in period one.
The timing of the game is as follows: (i) the CEO chooses whether to pay I and innovate;
(ii) period 1 revenue is realized and observed by the market that updates its assessment of the
CEO's talent; (iii) the CEO decides whether to leave the rm based on the comparison between
his expected period 2 income and his outside option.
The outside option for a CEO is to reallocate to another sector. As in Aghion, Van Reenen
and Zingales (2009), we assume that the ability is sector specic so compensation after relo-
cating is independent of the CEOs current talent and equal to:
2In the Appendix we show that qualitatively, results would be unchanged if one assumed that competition
has an impact on high ability CEOs as long as this impact is not as large as the one on low ability CEOs.
3Consider this simple rent seeking game that Baye and Hoppe (2003) show to be strategic equivalent to the
classic patent race model of Loury (1979). Two players H (high ability) and L (low ability) exert eort sustaining
marginal costs cH and cL with cH < cL. The probability that each player obtains the patent is xi=(xi + xj). If
the two players compete, they obtain the patent with probabilities pH = cL=(cL + cH) and pL = cH=(cL + cH).
Let us now increase competition by introducing a third player with marginal cost cM 2 [cH;cL]: The winning
probabilities become p
0
H = (cL + cM   cH)=(cL + cM + cH) and p
0
L = (cH + cM   cL)=(cL + cM + cH): Because
pL  p
0
L > pH  p
0






where  is the switching cost.
We solve the model by backward induction. If the CEO decides to innovate, market beliefs















w2(y1 = 0) =
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: (2)
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p
 (A1)
which guarantees that the manager will leave the rm if the revenue in period 1 is equal to
zero.4
In period 1, the CEO will innovate if his expected utility from innovation, U(i = 1)   I,
exceeds the ex-ante utility from not innovating, U(i = 0). Because without innovation the
market does not update its beliefs we have that:




If i = 1, the CEO's expected period 2 compensation is:
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2 p p there exists a non empty set of parameters (;;;p) which satisfy A1.
7where the rst term on the right side of (3) is the ex-ante probability that the CEO assigns to
a high revenue realization times w2(y1 = 1) and the second term is the ex-ante probability of
y1 = 0 times CEO's outside option.
Because the CEO innovates when U(i = 1)   I  U(i = 0) there will be innovation in
equilibrium only if innovation costs are not too large, specically:



















Condition (4) yields two sets of testable implications. The rst set of predictions relates to













innovation takes place for a larger range of innovation costs when the CEO is overcondent.
We can write this result as:
Implication 1 Overcondent CEOs are more likely to innovate than non-overcondent CEOs.
















(1 + )2 < 0
and the fact that  = 1    imply that overcondence and competition are complements (i.e.
@2b I=@o@ > 0).
Implication 2 The impact of CEO overcondence is stronger when product market competition
is higher.
2.1 Discussion
The model builds on a number of assumptions which are worthy of additional discussion.
First, we assumed that CEO talent is sector specic and that every time a CEO reallocates
to another sector he experiences a new draw from the distribution of ability. In the Appendix we
show that the model delivers the same set of testable implications if we assume that managerial
ability is the same in all sectors. Intuitively, even when poor performance harms both current
and future compensation, overcondent CEOs will underestimate the likelihood of doing badly
and therefore will be more likely to innovate. We show that the predictions hold even in the
8extreme case in which after a low revenue realization, the CEO leaves the rm and is never
hired by other sectors i.e. w = 0.
Second, we assumed that a CEO who reallocates to another sector sustains a switching cost
equal to . In the Appendix we show that this assumption, despite reducing the likelihood of
innovation, has no impact on the eect of overcondence and on its interaction with product
market competition. We also show that the two testable predictions are valid if the innovator
does not sustain the private innovation cost I. In this case innovation occurs only if U(i =
1)  U(i = 0), which is satised as long as the switching cost is below a threshold b : In the
Appendix we show that this threshold increases with o, and that @2b =@o@ > 0:
Third, our baseline model assumed that there is no impact of competition on non-innovating
CEOs. In the Appendix we extend the model assuming that in the absence of innovation the
rm may experience a loss and that the likelihood of this loss is greater when competition is
intense. In this case competition aects U(i = 0) because in the event of a loss the CEO has
to reallocate to a dierent sector. We show that the two testable predictions of our baseline
model hold in this alternative environment.
Finally, we assumed that high ability CEOs realize high revenue with probability p whereas
low ability CEOs realize it with probability p with  equal to 1   . In the Appendix we
generalize the framework assuming that the probabilities of high revenue realization are p()
if  =  and q() if  = 0 with p() and q() decreasing functions and p() < q(). We show
that CEO overcondence has a positive eect on innovation in this generalized setting. We
also show that the eect of overcondence increases with product market competition as long
as product market competition has a stronger impact on low talent CEO than on high ability
CEOs i.e. q0() < p0() < 0.
This generalized model highlights a distinction between our setting and the model of Aghion,
Van Reenen and Zingales (2009) that assume p = 1  (and that  does not depend on ). In
their model talent is more valuable when competition is less intense (if  = 1 both types of CEOs
realize zero revenue) whereas in our model talent is more valuable when competition is more
intense. In the Appendix we show that innovation takes place for a larger range of innovation
costs in both models when the CEO is overcondent. Moreover, once we x the innovation
cost I, there is a competition-threshold 0; such that when   0 both overcondent and
non-overcondent CEOs innovate, whereas only overcondent CEOs innovate when  > 0 .
This implies that in both our baseline model, and the extended version of Aghion, Van Reenen
and Zingales (2009), only overcondent CEOs innovate when competition is intense.
93 Data and Methods
3.1 Data
We begin with a panel of 450 large publicly traded U.S. rms between 1980 and 1994. These
data are described in Hall and Liebman (1998) and Yermack (1995). Each rm in the sample
appeared at least four times on a Forbes magazine list of the largest U.S. companies. These
data provide a very detailed picture of CEO's stock option holdings, which Malmendier and
Tate (2008) use to construct the measure of CEO overcondence described below.
We use the Compustat rm identier (GVKEY) to merge this panel of large publicly traded
rms to the NBER US patent data le. The NBER patent data are described in Hall et al.
(2001), and provide detailed information on all U.S. patents during our sample period, including
application and grant years, citations to other patents, and assignee codes that can be used
to identify the owner. To match U.S. patent assignee codes with Compustat rms, we started
with the name-matching tool of Bessen (2009) and then searched by hand for variations on the
names in our panel. After dropping rms in the Finance, Insurance and Real Estate sector
(one-digit SIC code 5), which has a very low rate of patenting, we arrive at an estimation
sample with 290 rms, 3,648 rm-years and 627 individual CEOs.5 Table 1 provides summary
statistics for this sample.
Our primary measure of innovation is a citation-weighted count of U.S. patents. This
measure builds on a substantial literature that documents the link between patents, citations
and rm value (Pakes and Griliches, 1980; Hall et al., 2005; Harho et al., 1999; Aghion et al.,
2009, inter alia). Patents are assigned to a rm-year observation using their ling date, and
we weight each patent by the truncation-adjusted citation count eld contained in the NBER
data (see Hall et al., 2001, for details).
We also consider several additional innovation metrics. First, we de-compose our primary
measure into an unweighted patent count, and the average number of citations per patent
(excluding self cites). Second, we use the research and development expenditures (Compustat
item 46) as a measure of innovation inputs. Since rms are not required to account for their
R&D expenditures, this variable has many missing values, even after we interpolate over any
gaps of three years or less. Finally, in a series of extensions, we examine changes in originality
and the share of self-citations. Table 1 shows that the distribution of innovative activity in our
sample is highly skewed. While the median rm-year observation consists of a single patent
that receives 6 citations, the sample mean is much higher, at 28 patents and 489 cites.
To measure competition, we use a Lerner index, as in Aghion et al. (2009). Specically,
5Retaining rms from the FIRE sector does not change the main results.
10we calculate the median gross margin of all rms in the Compustat database with the same
two-digit SIC code as a focal rm. Our baseline model allows this competition measure to vary
over time. However, we also consider robustness tests that use a time-invariant Lerner index,
or a dummy for rms whose average gross margin over the entire sample period falls above the
median of all rms in the estimation sample.
As additional controls, we use on a variety of the accounting data reported by Compustat.
Our main Compustat items are sales (item 1); a capital-labor ratio constructed from the book
value of total assets (item 6) and the number of employees (item 29); and a deated R&D stock.
To construct the R&D stock, we follow the method described in Hall (1990), depreciating all
reported R&D activity at a rate of 15 percent over a ten year period. As in Malmedier and Tate
(2005a, 2005b, 2008), we construct a measure of cash-ow adding Compustat earnings before
extraordinary items (item 18) and depreciation (item 14). We also have several CEO-level
control variables used in Malmendier and Tate (2008), including measures of stock and vested
option holdings, age, job tenure, and a set of dummies categorizing their educational background
as nance or technical. CEOs with a \nance" background received a degree in accounting,
nance, business (including MBA) or economics. CEOs with a \technical" background received
a degree in engineering, physics, chemistry, mathematics, operations research, biology or applied
sciences.
3.2 Measuring Overcondence
Our measures of CEO overcondence build on a series of papers by Malmendier and Tate.
These papers use CEOs' personal investment decisions to construct a proxy for overcondence,
or systematic over-estimation of the returns to holding stock in their own rm. The key idea
behind this measurement strategy is to focus on the decision to exercise executive stock options.
These options give the holder a right to purchase stock in their own company, usually at the
prevailing price on the date of the option grant. They typically have a ten year life, and are
fully exercisable after a four year vesting period. At exercise, the shares are almost always
immediately sold (Ofek and Yermack, 2000).
While investors may hold ordinary options because the right to delay a stock purchase has
positive value (Merton, 1973), executive stock options have several unique features that create
strong incentives for exercise, so long as they are fully vested (and in the money). In particular,
executive stock options are non-tradable, and CEOs cannot legally hedge their risk by short-
selling shares in their own rm. Moreover, most CEOs are highly exposed to idiosyncratic risk
associated with their own rm through equity compensation, stock holdings and rm-specic
human capital. Consequently, standard models of decision-making under uncertainty (e.g. Hall
11and Murphy, 2002) indicate that a risk-averse CEO should exercise vested executive options
before expiration as long as the stock price is suciently high. Nevertheless, many of the
CEOs in our sample fail to exercise their executive options, often repeatedly. Malmendier and
Tate use this behavior as an indicator of CEO overcondence, or systematic over-estimation of
expected returns from holding the stock.
While there are other potential explanations for a CEO's decision to hold fully vested ex-
ecutive options, Malmendier and Tate (2008) provide strong evidence for the overcondence
interpretation. In particular, their research shows that failure to exercise in-the-money execu-
tive options is positively associated with value-destroying merger and acquisition activity, and
a relatively high sensitivity of investments to cash ows. These ndings are consistent with
the idea that overcondent CEOs believe they can make good investments, but perceive the
market price of debt nancing as too high. Malmendier and Tate also nd that CEOs do not
earn abnormal returns from holding their executive options, relative to a benchmark case of
exercising the options and investing the proceeds in an S&P 500 stock index. This suggests that
\late" exercise does not reect inside information about the future prospects of the company.
After considering a variety of other interpretations (e.g. board pressure, risk-tolerance, taxes
and procrastination) Malmendier and Tate (2008) argue that the broad pattern of results is
most consistent with the idea that CEOs who fail to exercise their fully vested and in the money
executive options are systematically over-estimating the future performance of their own rm,
i.e. they are overcondent. We build on the measurement strategy of Malmendier and Tate
(2008) to construct two proxies for CEO overcondence:
Holder67 This indicator variable is identical to the Holder67 variable in Malmendier and
Tate (2008). To construct this variable, they examine all CEO option packages ve years before
expiration (after they are fully vested). The variable Holder 67 equals one for any CEO that
fails to exercise an executive option at that time after their stock price has risen by at least
67 percent. This 67 percent exercise threshold is calibrated using the Hall and Murphy (2002)
framework, assuming that two-thirds of CEO wealth is tied to company stock. Under this
framework, failing to exercise an option that is 67 percent in the money implies a constant
relative risk-aversion parameter of three. This measure treats overcondence as an absorbing
state: once a CEO becomes overcondent, they will never change back. While a CEO may
switch from \rational" to overcondent within our sample, it is a rare event; most retain their
initial classication throughout the sample period.
In our estimation sample, Holder67 classies roughly half of all CEOs as overcondent.
However, a large proportion of all CEOs are not classied, either because they served a short
tenure (so there was no opportunity to exercise a fully vested option package), or because their
12stock price did not appreciate by 67 percent. Moreover, Holder67 is only dened for CEOs
who have been with a company for at least four years. Thus, our estimation sample contains
1,344 observations where Holder67 is dened. One can think of Holder67 as identifying CEOs
who become overcondent following a 67 percent increase in the stock price of their rm. Our
second measure is motivated by the idea that overcondence may be a permanent trait.
Overcondence This measure is a CEO xed eect that equals one for all CEOs where
Holder67 equals one, and zero for all CEOs where Holder67 equals zero. In practical terms,
Overcondence is simply the maximum value of Holder67 for a given CEO. This is useful for
models where we wish to exploit within-rm variation associated with the arrival of an over-
condent CEO, as opposed to cross-sectional dierence between rms. While Overcondence
is dened for 2,230 observations in our sample, there are still 1,418 observations where it is
undened because of a short tenure or a stock that did not appreciate by at least 67 percent.
Our main results are robust re-classifying these missing CEOs as non-onvercondent (though
we have no justication for doing so).
Our data have some limitations relative those in Malmendeir and Tate (2008). For example,
while they show that the choice of a particular cut-o does not aect the main results, we only
observe the Holder67 dummy, and cannot use the detailed option-holdings to construct alter-
native exercise thresholds. Malmendier and Tate (2008) also use a variable called Longholder,
which denes a CEO as overcondent if they hold an executive option until the year of expira-
tion. We do not use this measure because many Longholder CEOs are in non-patenting sectors
of the economy, so we are left with only 23 Longholder CEOs in our panel that actually receive
a patent.
3.3 Methods
Our main econometric models focus on the relationship between count-based measures of inno-
vative activity Yit at rm i in period t, and measures of CEO overcondence Oit. We typically
model the conditional expectation of innovative activity as
E[Yit] = exp(Oit + xit 1 + i + t) (5)
where xit 1 is a vector of control variables (lagged one period to account for obvious forms of
simultaneity), i is a rm-specic idiosyncratic eect, and t is a vector of time-period eects.
Equation (5) uses the log-link formulation because of the non-negative and highly skewed nature
of our count-based dependent variables. However, Wooldridge (1999) emphasizes that Poisson
quasi maximum-likelihood estimation will yield consistent estimates as long as the conditional
13mean is correctly specied, making it equally appropriate for positive and continuously-valued
variables, such as R&D. We allow for arbitrary heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (i.e.
clustering standard errors).6
When x includes measures of the rm's R&D stock, equation (5) can be interpreted as a
\knowledge production function" that translates past research investments into new inventions.
In that formulation,  indicates whether rms led by overcondent CEOs receive more cite-
weighted patents per dollar of R&D expenditure, so it is a measure of eciency. We also
estimate models that omit the R&D stock from x, in which case  measures the combined
eect of changes in R&D stocks and inventive eciency.
The main method that we use to introduce the rm-specic eects i in equation (5) is the
\mean scaling" estimator of Blundell et al. (1999), that relaxes the strict exogeneity assumption
underlying the the xed-eects Poisson estimator of Hausman et al. (1984). The mean scaling
estimator provides consistent estimates under the weaker assumption of predetermined xit (as
long as the rst-moments of the data are stable). This method uses pre-sample data on the
dependent variable to construct a mean, which then enters the estimation directly (analogously
to xit) to account for initial conditions. Blundell et al. (1999) show that this approach performs
well even with relatively short pre-sample periods. We use ten years of pre-sample data below.
In Appendix Table B1 we show that our main results are robust to using the xed-eects
Poisson estimator (Hausman et al., 1984), which is analogous to the familiar within-group OLS
estimator.
4 Results
4.1 Overcondence and Innovation
Table 2 presents our rst set of regression results, which show a robust positive association
between CEO overcondence and innovation. The dependent variable in all models is a cite-
weighted patent count, or equivalently, a total citation count for the issued patents applied for in
year t. All models in Table 2 are estimated via Poisson, with robust standard errors to account
for over dispersion. Columns (1) through (4) use the Overcondence measure, while models
(5) and (6) consider the alternative Holder67, which leads to a smaller estimation sample.
We begin in column (1) with a pooled cross sectional model that includes only year and two-
digit SIC code eects, along with the overcondence measure. Exponentiating the coecient
of 0.67 suggests that the overcondent CEOs in our sample receive roughly twice as many
cite-weighted patents as their non-overcondent counterparts.
6Our results are robust to clustering standard errors at the level of two digits SIC codes, rms or CEOs.
14In column (2) we introduce rm xed eects using the mean scaling approach of Blundell
et al. (1999). While the Overcondence coecient falls to 0.39, or a 48 percent dierence in
innovative output, the correlation between CEO overcondence and citation-weighted patents
remains quite strong. Column (3) adds controls for sales, the rm's capital to labor ratio,
the CEO's age, age squared, the CEO's tenure and tenure squared. This produces almost no
change in the Overcondence coecient relative to the model containing only the pre-sample
means of inventive output.
In columns (1) through (3), the Overcondence coecient  measures the joint impact
of changes in eciency (more output per dollar of R&D) and innovative intensity (greater
spending on innovation). In column (4) we add the log of each rm's R&D stock, so the model
becomes a patent production function, where  measures current patenting per dollar of lagged
R&D spending. As expected, we observe a very robust positive correlation between past R&D
and current patenting (see Hall et al., 2005). The coecient on Overcondence also declines by
about 33 percent, to 0.246, indicating that Overcondent CEOs obtain 28 percent more cite-
weighted patents per dollar of lagged R&D spending than their counterparts. This dierence
could reect either a higher patent propensity among overcondent CEOs, or a change in the
direction of innovative activity that leads to greater research productivity.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) estimate the same models as columns (3) and (4) using the
alternative Holder67 measure of overcondence. Since Holder67 is only dened starting in the
year when a CEO holds a fully vested executive stock option that has appreciated by 67 percent
or more, the sample size declines sharply. However, the pattern of results is very similar. While
the coecient on overcondence is slightly greater, it still falls by about 20 percent when we
move to a production function model that includes the R&D stock. Overall, the results in
Table 2 document a strong positive association between overcondence and innovation that is
robust to a variety of measurement and empirical modeling strategies. We take these results
as support of the rst prediction in the theoretical model.
4.2 Alternative Innovation Measures
Table 3 asks whether our baseline results in Table 2 are driven by greater output (more patents),
greater input (more R&D), or greater impact (more cites). We nd the answer to be \yes"
based on production function estimates with and without rm eects.
The rst two columns in Table 3 use unweighted patent counts as the dependent variable.
The results in column (1) suggest that overcondent CEOs le for about 20 percent more
patents per dollar of lagged R&D stock than CEOs who are not overcondent. Adding xed
eects in column (2) causes the coecients on sales and lagged R&D stock to fall, but has no
15noticeable eect on the Overcondence coecient.
The middle two columns examine the link between Overcondence and R&D. We drop the
lagged R&D stock in this specication, since we are focused on inputs. In column (3), we nd
that overcondent CEOs perform about 18 percent more R&D than a typical CEO. Adding
rm eects reduces this eect slightly (to 17 percent).
The last two columns in Table 3 examine the correlation between CEO Overcondence and
citations per patent. The results | both with and without rm eects | show a roughly twenty
percent increase in the mean citation rate. Interestingly, there is little correlation between the
rm level controls of sales, the capital-labor ratio or the R&D stock and the average citation
rate. We nd these last results especially intriguing, as they evoke a change in innovative
direction or impact, as opposed to merely an increase in the amount of R&D or patenting by
overcondent CEOs.
4.3 Overcondence and Competition
Table 4 presents several results related to the second prediction of our model. Specically,
the model suggests that the association between overcondence and innovation will be stronger
when rms face more competition. To examine this relationship, we interact the Overcondence
indicator variable with several variations on the Lerner index, or gross margin, which we assume
is inversely related to product market competition. All of these regressions use our baseline
patent production function specication (see column (4) in Table 2).
Column (1) uses a time-varying Lerner index calculated as the median gross margin of all
rms in a particular two-digit SIC code. In this specication, the main eect of Overcondence
is economically large and statistically signicant. While the main eect of the Lerner index
is negative (less competition yields less innovation), the eect is not statistically signicant.
To provide a sense of the eect size, we note that a one standard deviation change in the
Lerner index (or an additional 5 points of gross margin) is associated with a roughly 3 percent
change in cite-weighted patents per dollar of R&D stock. However, the slope of this relationship
between competition and innovation is roughly an order of magnitude larger for overcondent
CEOs. In particular, the interaction between Overcondence and the Lerner index is large and
statistically signicant, as predicted by our model.
In column (2), we nd a qualitatively similar pattern using the Holder67 measure of CEO
overcondence. The main eect of overcondence is economically large and statistically sig-
nicant. The main eect of competition is negligible. And the interaction is negative and
signicant. Once again, the interpretation is that the relationship between Overcondence and
citation-weighted patents is stronger for rms facing more competition.
16Columns (3) and (4) return to our primary Overcondence measure, but use dierent mea-
sures of competition. In column (3) we restrict the Lerner index to be constant over time, but
continue to base the measure on the median gross margin of all Compustat rms in a two-digit
SIC code. Note that we cannot estimate a main eect of competition in such a model, since
the measure is collinear with industry eects. The results in column (3) are nevertheless very
close to those in column (1).
Finally, column (4) measures competition using Lerner50, a dummy for rms in an industry
with a time invariant Lerner index that is above the median of all rms in our data set. Thus, we
rely on within-sample variation in competition, rather than variation in the entire Compustat
dataset. Once again, we nd that the relationship between innovation and overcondence is
stronger when competition is more intense.
4.4 Extensions and Robustness
4.4.1 Overcondence and Innovative Direction
Next, we use a series of alternative outcome variables to explore the idea that overcondent
CEOs do not simply increase the level of innovation, but rather cause a change in the direction
pursued by the rms they manage. In columns (1) and (2) of Table 5, the outcome variable is
an originality weighted patent count. Originality, as dened in Hall et al. (2001), is essentially
one minus a Herndahl of the concentration of a patent's backwards citations across classes.
Thus, more original patents cite a more diverse array of prior art. The results in columns (1)
and (2) show that originality weighted patent counts increase with CEO Overcondence, and
more so in industries with lower gross margins.
In columns (3) and (4), we use self-citations to construct a new measure called the Derivative
Patent Share. We classify a patent as derivative if more than half of its total citations are
to other patents assigned to the same rm, i.e. they are self cites. We then calculate the
proportion of all patents that are \derivative" for a given rm-year and use that proportion
as our outcome variable. Column (3) shows that there is no meaningful relationship between
Overcondence and the derivative patent share in the pooled panel regressions. However, when
Overcondence is interacted with competition, we nd that derivative patenting declines for
overcondent CEOs, but increases for overcondent CEOs when there is little competition.
This result suggests that overcondent CEOs in protable industries increase innovation, but
focus on familiar problems. Overcondent CEOs in highly competitive elds appear to try for
new innovations, perhaps in an eort to escape from the levels of competition at their current
product-market location.
174.4.2 CEO Autonomy and Cash Flow Sensitivity
To examine whether the impact of overcondence is inuenced by the degree of autonomy of
the CEO, we introduce a dummy for CEOs who also hold the titles of Chairman and President.
These titles are used in the corporate governance literature as proxies for centralized executive
control over corporate decisions. Thus, we expect the impact of overcondence to be stronger
for CEOs who are also Chairman and President. The coecients in columns (1) and (2) of
Table 6 conrm this prediction and show that the eects of overcondence and Holder67 are
roughly 42 percentage points larger when the CEO has multiple titles.
We also explore the sensitivity of R&D investments to cash ow.7 As stressed in Mal-
mandier and Tate (2005, 2008) overcondent CEOs should prefer internal funds to external
funds because they perceive their company to be undervalued by the market. Therefore, we
should expect R&D investments of overcondent CEOs to be more sensitive to cash ow. In
columns (3) and (4) of Table 6 we control for cash ow and its interaction with the measures of
overcondence. We did not nd any signicant impact of cash ow on R&D investment for non-
overcondent CEOs. Conversely, R&D investments are sensitive to cash ow for overcondent
CEOs: the interaction terms are positive and signicant.8
4.4.3 Additional Robustness Checks
Finally, this sub-section describes a variety of additional extensions and robustness checks.
Interested readers may refer to Appendix B to nd the tables associated with these models.
Endogeneity
Because overcondent CEOs are not randomly matched to rms, there is a concern that our
results may be driven by companies that appoint overcondent CEOs in periods of successful
innovation. To take this concern into account, in Appendix Table B2, we use a sub-sample
of the larger data set and conduct a within-rm analysis that identies the Overcondence
eect purely from changes in innovative activity before and after CEO changes that create an
increase in overcondence.
For this analysis, we begin by identifying 28 cases where a CEO who was either not-
overcondent or unclassied was replaced by an overcondent CEO (see Table B3 for a list).
In each case, we retained data for the four years preceding the switch and all years of data
7We dene cash-ow as Compustat earnings before extraordinary items (item18) plus depreciation (item 14).
8We also explored the impact of cash ow on the productivity of R&D (i.e. citation weighted patent counts).
We found that R&D productivity of overcondent CEOs is sensitive to cash ow only for the most cash con-
strained rms (those in the bottom quartile of our sample for the Kaplan and Zingales (1996) measure of internal
resources).
18for the overcondent CEO. To obtain a sample of control switched, we performed a similar
exercise to identify cases where a not-overcondent or unclassied CEO was replaced by a not-
overcondent CEO. We use this dataset to conduct two types of analysis. First, we compare
the change in innovation when the new CEO is overcondent to the change in innovation when
the new CEO is not overcondent, which leads to the familiar dierence-dierences estimator.
Second, we consider the simple before versus after comparison for switches that lead to an
overcondent CEO. In the rst case, we include a separate time trend for the overcondent
and control switches, to test for a dierence in the innovation trends across rms prior to the
arrival of a new CEO. All of these models are estimated in the xed-eects Poisson specication
to isolate within-rm variation, and we drop the rm-level controls which are unlikely to be
strictly exogenous.9
The rst two columns in Table B2 present the results for citation-weighted patent counts.
Column (1) shows the dierence in dierences results. Following a switch to an overcon-
dent CEO, cite-weighted patents rise by 55 percent more than following a switch to a non-
overcondent CEO. We cannot reject the hypothesis that there is no dierence in the pre-switch
patenting trends, although the estimated trend during that four year period is roughly twice
as high for the rms that received an overcondent CEO. Column (2) focuses on the before
versus after comparison within \treated" rms | a regression that would not be identied if
all rms switched in the same year. This model shows a large increase in cite-weighted patents
following the switch.
Figure 1 provides an alternative look at the impact of a switch to an overcondent CEO on
cite-weighted patents. Here, we allow the \treatment eect" to vary for each year, normalizing
the coecient for one year before the switch to zero. The gure shows that there is no discernible
trend prior to the switch. In the year of the switch, there is a sharp increase, which doubles
over the next two to four years, before levelling o.
Columns (3) and (4) in Table B2 examine un-weighted patent counts. While we nd ev-
idence of an increase in patenting, it is less dramatic than the results for citation-weighted
patents. The dierence in dierence estimates show that a 17 percent increase in patenting
following a switch to an overcondent CEO. This eect is not statistically dierent from zero. If
we exclude the switches to a non-overcondent CEO the point estimate on patenting increases
to 29 percent and is signicant at the 10 percent level.
Finally, columns (5) and (6) examine changes in citations per patent. Here we nd a large
dierence in the change between switches to overcondent and non-overcondent CEOs. In
9We keep CEO controls in the dierence in dierences analysis but drop them in the before versus after
comparison because of the small sample size.
19column (5), the coecient on Overcondence implies that the patent citation rate increases
by 40 percent following the arrival of an overcondent CEO. The eect is small, though still
signicant at the 10 percent level when we focus on the before-after comparison.
While the analysis of CEO switching helps address concerns about endogenous matching,
one might also be concerned about reverse causality. In particular, if an exogenous increase
in innovation leads CEOs to become overcondent, and thus hold more options, overcondent
CEOs are not aecting innovation; it is innovation that causes overcondence.
However, we have two pieces of evidence that help distinguish the direction of causality.
First, the results in columns (1) and (2) in Table 6 indicate that the correlation between over-
condence and innovation is stronger for CEOs that have greater autonomy. This correlation
is dicult to reconcile with reverse causality. In particular, if increased innovation is causing a
change in condence, the results in Table 6 would imply that CEOs with less autonomy become
overcondent more easily (i.e. at a lower innovation level) than CEOs with greater control.
Second, to further investigate the direction of causality we split the overcondence dummy
into two separate dummy variables: Pre-Holder67 and Post-Holder67. Post-Holder67 is equal
to one only after the CEO reveals his overcondence for the rst time. Including both variables
in our baseline regression, we nd that only Post-Holder67 is statistically signicant, thus
suggesting that it is not an increase in patenting activity that induces CEOs to postpone
option exercise.10
Conditional Fixed Eects
While the mean scaling estimator allows us to include pre-determined (but not strictly exoge-
nous) rm-level covariates, it does not isolate the within-rm co-variation of overcondence
and innovation (as evidenced by the fact that we can include the SIC eects). To isolate such
variation, in Table B1 we rely on the xed-eects Poisson estimator (Hausman et al., 1984)
which is analogous to the familiar within group OLS estimator and assumes that all covariates
are strictly exogenous.
In columns (1) and (3) we use the overcondence dummy and therefore exploit only variation
between overcondent and non-overcondent CEOs within rms. In columns (2) and (4) we use
the Holder67 dummy and estimate its coecient using not only within rm variation but also
variation between years when a CEOs is classied as overcondent or not. Despite eliminating
all cross-sectional variation, we still nd support for the two testable implications of our model:
overcondence is positively correlated with innovation and the correlation is stronger when
10We also examined whether the increase in patenting was concentrated in the rst two years after the over-
condence is revealed. We nd that there is no statistical dierence between innovation in the rst 2 years after
overcondence is revealed and innovation in the subsequent years.
20product market competition is intense. While many of our other results are robust to this
alternative estimator, some lose statistical signicance. This is not surprising given the limited
CEO turnover within rms: Table 2 shows that we observe only 1.3 CEOs per rm in our main
regressions.
Alternative Controls and Specications
In Table B4 we present a series of extensions that demonstrate the robustness of our main results
to including extra covariates and changing the model specication. In column (1) we show that
our estimates are not aected when we control for vested option holdings (options that are
exercisable within six months as a fraction of common shares outstanding) and stock ownership
(fraction of stock owned by the CEO and his immediate family). In column (2) we control for
CEO educational background. Although we lose roughly 32 percent of the observations because
of missing data on educational background, there is essentially no change in the overcondence
coecient. In column (3) we allow for dynamics using a multiplicative feedback model that
controls for the logarithm of lagged cite-weighted patent counts. Not surprisingly we found
strong persistence in patenting; the coecient on lagged patents is highly signicant. The
coecient on overcondence is positive and signicant at the 0.1 level. Finally, in column (4)
we show that results are similar when using a negative binomial regression model.
Execucomp Data
Our main analysis uses a dataset originally constructed by Yermack (1995), Hall and Liebman
(1998) and Malmandier and Tate (2005a; 2005b; 2008). The main virtue of these data is the
presence of Holder67, the measure of overcondence developed by Malmendier and Tate (2008).
Their primary limitation is the small sample, which contains only 290 innovating rms. In this
nal sub-section, we explore the relation between overcondence and innovation using the larger
S&P ExecuComp Compustat database, which reports information on executive compensation
for S&P 1,500 companies from 1992 to 2009. To avoid truncation problems with the patent
data, we focus on the period 1992-2001.
The ExecuComp dataset provides information both on the salary and on the aggregate value
of the stock options awarded to the CEOs. Because grant and expiration date of the individual
option packages are not reported, we cannot construct the Holder 67 measure. Nevertheless,
we constructed an alternative measure, Holder67-EC, based on aggregate stock option holdings
but similar in spirit to Holder67.11 Intuitively, we identied the CEOs that did not exercise
11Dezso and Ross (2010) use a similar measure to examine the correlation between CEO options-holding and
the cost of borrowing.
21a substantial amount of their stock options despite a considerable increase in the underlying
stock value.
Specically, we focus on CEOs that during their tenure experienced an increase of at least
67 percent in the stock price over a 5 year period. For all these CEOs, we constructed the
ratio between the value of unexercised exercisable options and the CEOs salary and bonus.
Finally, we classied a CEO as a Holder67-EC if after a 67 percent stock price increase, the
ration of vested option to income was above the 95th percentile of the entire options-income
distribution.12 As for the Holder67 measure, once a CEO is classied as Holder67-EC he keeps
that label for the remaining sample years. We also created a variable Overcondence-EC equal
to the maximum of Holder67-EC.
In the new sample, there are 1899 CEOs for which Overcondence-EC is dened. About
ten percent of these CEOs are classied as overcondent. The nal sample contains 1491
innovating rms and 7123 observations. The mean rm-year observation consists of 20 patents
that receive 344 citations. The average rm in the new sample has 5,365 employees whereas
the average rm in the dataset described in Section 3 has 14,565 employees.
Appendix Table B5 investigates the relation between overcondence and innovation in this
alternative sample. The coecients on Overcondence-EC and Holder67-EC are positive and
signicant thus supporting the rst testable implication of our theoretical model. We also nd
support for the second prediction, the coecient on the interaction between the Lerner index
and overcondence is negative and signicant.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we study the relationship between CEO overcondence and innovation. We
use a simple career concern model to show that CEO overcondence can increase innovation.
The model also predicts that the impact of overcondence will be stronger when product
market competition is more intense. We nd strong empirical support for these predictions.
In particular, overcondent CEOs obtain more cite-weighted patents, and this eect increases
with product market competition.
These ndings suggest that overcondent CEOs are more likely to initiate a signicant
change in their rm's innovation strategy. They also suggest that applying tools from behavioral
economics to questions in the eld of innovation may yield novel insights into the determinants
12We experimented with alternative cuto rules (75th , 85th and 90th percentiles of the option-income ratio
distribution) and found that the correlation between innovation and overcondence is robust to variation in the
value of the threshold. The interaction eect with product market competition is more sensitive to the cuto
rule, and results are consistent with Implication 2 only for cuto rules above the 90th percentile.
22of R&D investments and patenting. Our ndings are complementary to those in Aghion,
Van Reenen and Zingales (2009). While they show that institutional ownership encourages
innovation by reducing the likelihood that a CEO is dismissed after a decline in prots, our
results show that overcondence encourage innovation by reducing the CEOs internal beliefs
about the likelihood of failure.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Min Max S.D. Obs.
Total Cites 489.01 6.00 0.00 32,509 1,747 3648
Total Patents 27.79 1.00 0.00 1,221 81.29 3648
Cites per Patent 8.62 4.00 0.00 240 13.32 3648
log(R&D Expense) 3.80 3.92 0.00 8.73 1.94 1864
Overcondence 0.58 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 2441
Holder67 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.50 1533
Lerner Index 0.11 0.09 0.03 0.22 0.05 3648
CEO Chairman 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.49 3640
log(Cash Flow) 5.31 5.33 -5.45 13.92 1.51 3624
log(Sales) 7.85 7.75 2.95 11.81 1.12 3641
log(Employees) 2.68 2.72 -2.23 6.78 1.29 3627






Holder67 is a dummy equal to 1 for all CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise
an option 67% in the money with 5 years remaining duration. Overcondence is
the maximum value for Holder67 for a given CEO. Lerner Index is the median
gross prot margin of all Compustat rms in a 2-digit SIC code. Cash Flow
equals Compustat earnings before extraordinary items (item 18) plus depreciation
(item 14). CEO Chairman is a dummy equal to one if a CEO also holds the titles
of Chairman and President.
28Table 2: Overcondence and Innovation
Poisson Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Dependent Variable = Total Cites
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overcondence 0.674*** 0.389** 0.360*** 0.246**
(0.22) (0.16) (0.13) (0.11)
Holder67 0.548*** 0.411***
(0.13) (0.12)
ln(Sales) 0.414*** 0.202* 0.415*** 0.056
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
ln(Capital/Labor) -0.062 0.088 0.116 0.298**
(0.13) (0.10) (0.17) (0.12)
ln(R&D Stock) 0.324*** 0.497***
(0.08) (0.09)
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC 2-digit Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO Controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
BGV Firm Eects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 2441 2441 2441 2441 1512 1512
Firms 229 229 227 227 226 226
CEOs 303 303 301 301 301 301
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% signicance; ***1% sig-
nicance. Holder67 is a dummy equal to 1 for all CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise an
option 67% in the money with 5 years remaining duration. Overcondence is the maximum value
for Holder67 for a given CEO. BGV xed eects are based on including pre-sample means of the
dependent variable. CEO controls are Age, Age
2, Tenure and Tenure
2.
29Table 3: Overcondence and Alternative Innovation Measures
Poisson Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Unweighted R&D Citations
Outcome Variable Patents Expense per Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overcondence 0.199** 0.183*** 0.164* 0.155** 0.198*** 0.202***
(0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
ln(R&D Stock) 0.428*** 0.229*** 0.018 -0.004
(0.05) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
ln(Sales) 0.400*** 0.190*** 1.057*** 0.767*** 0.047 0.043
(0.08) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.14) (0.13)
ln(Capital/Labor) 0.039 0.041 -0.339* -0.276*** 0.023 0.038
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC 2-digit Eects Yes Yes Yes n/a Yes Yes
CEO Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Eects No BGV No Yes No BGV
Observations 2229 2229 1216 1199 2229 2229
Firms 209 209 123 119 209 209
CEOs 279 279 167 163 279 279
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% signicance; ***1% signicance.
Overcondence is the maximum value for Holder67 for a given CEO where Holder67 is a dummy equal to
1 for all CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise an option 67% in the money with 5 years remaining
duration. BGV xed eects are based on including pre-sample means of the dependent variable. CEO
controls are Age, Age
2, Tenure and Tenure
2.
30Table 4: Competition Interactions
Poisson Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Dependent Variable = Total Cites
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overcondence 0.744*** 0.643*** 0.330***
(0.18) (0.23) (0.12)
Lerner Index -0.487 -0.947
(4.12) (4.07)




Lerner x Holder67 -2.830**
(1.35)
LernerSIC x Overconf -3.598**
(1.49)
Lerner50 x Overconf -0.505**
(0.24)
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC 2-digit Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Eects BGV BGV BGV BGV
Observations 2200 1344 2200 2200
Firms 207 200 207 207
CEOs 277 270 277 277
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% signi-
cance; ***1% signicance. Holder67 is a dummy equal to 1 for all CEO years
after the CEO fails to exercise an option 67% in the money with 5 years remain-
ing duration. Overcondence is the maximum value for Holder67 for a given
CEO. Lerner Index is the median gross prot margin of all Compustat rms
in a 2-digit SIC code (see text). BGV xed eects are based on including pre-
sample means of the dependent variable. All models control for ln(R&D Stock),
ln(Sales), ln(Capital/Labor) and CEO Age, Age
2, Tenure and Tenure
2.
31Table 5: Overcondence and Innovative Direction
Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Originality Derivative
Outcome Variable Weighted Patents Patent Share
Poisson Poisson OLS OLS
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overcondence 0.188** 0.406*** -0.006 -0.031**
(0.08) (0.13) (0.01) (0.01)
Lerner SIC x Overconf -2.055* 0.275**
(1.24) (0.11)
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC 2-digit Eects Yes Yes n/a n/a
Firm Eects BGV BGV Yes Yes
Observations 2124 2124 1343 1343
Firms 199 199 155 155
CEOs 268 268 206 206
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% signif-
icance; ***1% signicance. See Hall et al. (2001) for a denition of originality.
Derivative patents have more than 50 percent of self-citations. Overcon-
dence is the maximum value for Holder67 for a given CEO where Holder67
is a dummy equal to 1 for all CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise an
option 67% in the money with 5 years remaining duration. Lerner Index is
the median gross prot margin of all Compustat rms in a 2-digit SIC code
(see text). LernerSIC and Lerner50 are alternative measures of industry gross-
protability that exclude longitudinal variation (see text). BGV xed eects
are based on including pre-sample means of the dependent variable. All mod-
els control for ln(R&D Stock), ln(Sales), ln(Capital/Labor) and CEO Age,
Age
2, Tenure and Tenure
2.
32Table 6: CEO Independence and Cash Flow Interactions
Poisson Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Outcome Variable Total Cites R&D Expense













Overconf x ln(CashFlow) 0.063***
(0.02)
Holder67 x ln(CashFlow) 0.050*
(0.03)
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC 2-digit Eects Yes Yes N/A N/A
CEO Controls Yes Yes No No
Firm Eects BGV BGV Yes Yes
Observations 2195 1344 1199 747
Firms 207 200 119 113
CEOs 277 270 163 155
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% signicance;
***1% signicance. CEO Chairman is a dummy equal to one if a CEO also holds
the titles of Chairman and President. Cash Flow equals Compustat earnings before
extraordinary items (item 18) plus depreciation (item 14). Overcondence is the
maximum value for Holder67 for a given CEO where Holder67 is a dummy equal to
1 for all CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise an option 67% in the money with
5 years remaining duration. BGV xed eects are based on including pre-sample
means of the dependent variable. All models control for ln(R&D Stock), ln(Sales),
ln(Capital/Labor) and CEO Age, Age
2, Tenure and Tenure
2.
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Years Since CEO Switch
Coefﬁcient 95% CI
This gure plots coecient estimates and robust standard errors from a Poisson
regression with rm conditional xed eects, a full set of calendar year eects, and
a full set of year-relative-to-CEO-switch dummies (omitting the year prior to the
change in CEO). The dependent variable is Total Cites. The estimation sample
contains four years prior to the CEO switch and all years following the switch for
all rms that replace a non-Overcondent CEO with an Overcondent CEO.
34Appendix A: Extensions to the Theoretical Model
Non-Sector Specic Ability
In the baseline model we assumed that CEO talent is sector specic and that after relocating to





We now relax this assumption and consider the case in which managerial ability is the same
in all sectors. This implies that after low revenue realization the compensation obtained in a
dierent sector will be
w = w2(y1 = 0)    =
1   p
2   p   p
   
and that a CEO will never switch sector as long as  > 0: If i = 1, CEO's expected period 2
compensation is:
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Because innovation occurs only if I  b I = U(i = 1)   U(i = 0) and U(i = 0) = =2 does






2 (p + p   2)
2 (3 +    2p(1 + ))  0
so both of our testable implications hold in this alternative setting.
Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2009) consider the extreme case in which, after a low
revenue realization, the CEO leaves the rm and is never hired by other sectors i.e. w = 0: In
this case the ex ante compensation of a manager that innovates is:










Notice that U(i = 1) U(i = 0)  0 if o = 0 (non-overcondent CEOs never innovate when
35w= 0) and that this dierence becomes positive for overcondent CEOs as long as p is not too
small. Moreover @U(i = 1)=@o  0 and @2U(i = 1)=@o@  0 therefore this alternative model
is also consistent with our testable predictions.
No Switching Cost
In the baseline model we assumed that when a CEO reallocates to another sector he sustains a
switching cost : If CEOs can switch costlessy w = =2. The absence of switching costs renders
innovation more appealing because there is a higher payo in the case of low revenue realization.
Nevertheless, even in this alternative setting @U(i = 1)=@o  0 and @2U(i = 1)=@o@  0.
Therefore the assumption that  > 0 has no impact on our testable predictions.
No Innovation Cost
In the baseline model we assumed that the CEO sustains a private cost I when he innovates.
If we remove this cost innovation occurs as long as U(i = 1)  U(i = 0) that is satised as long
as the switching cost is not too large:
  b  = p(   1)
o +    o + 1
2p   4 + 4p + 2p2 + 2op   2op2   4
:







( + 1)(p + p + op   op   2)
2:






2   5p   4p + p2   op + 2op   op2 + 6

( + 1)
2 (p + p + op   op   2)
3 < 0
and therefore overcondence and competition are complements (i.e. @2b =@o@ > 0) as in our
baseline model. To see this notice that the second term in the denominator is negative because
p + p + op   op   2 =
p(1 + ) + op(1   )   2 
2p   2  0:
The term 2   5p   4p + p2   op + 2op   op2 + 6 in the numerator is positive as long
36as
p  e p(o) =
2 + 6
o(1   )2 + 4   2 + 5
and because e p0(o) < 0 and e p(1) = 1 the term is positive for any value of  and o.
Competition Aects Non-Innovating Managers
We now relax the assumption that U(i = 0) is not aected by product market competition and
extend the model assuming that competition aects non-innovating managers because it forces
them to relocate to a dierent sector. We follow Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2009) and
assume that with probability f() a non innovating rm incurs a loss and that f0() > 0. We
also assume that that the CEO must relocate whenever the loss is incurred. In this case the
CEO payo without innovation is:




Because an increase in  increases the net gain U(i = 1)   I   U(i = 0); competition renders
innovation more appealing. It is important to notice that in this setting, as in our baseline
model, U(i = 0) does not depend on o. This implies that the two testable predictions of our
baseline model hold in this alternative environment.13
Generalization of the Competition Eect
In the baseline model we assumed that the dierence in talent between high and low quality
CEOs was captured by  = 1   . We now generalize the framework by assuming that if the
CEO innovates (i = 1), the period 1 revenue realization is equal to:
y1 =
(
1 with probability p()
0 with probability 1   p()
if  =  and it is equal to
13If the probability of incurring the loss is also aected by overcondence (i.e. f(o;) with @f=@o < 0) an























1 with probability q()
0 with probability 1   q()
if ability is low. We assume q0() < p0() < 0 and q()  p(): competition reduces the
likelihood of high revenue but its eect is stronger for low ability CEOs. In this setting
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and that the CEO innovates when U(i = 1)   I  U(i = 0): Therefore innovation occurs in
equilibrium only if innovation costs are not too large, specically:
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because p0()   q0() > 0 so the second testable prediction is also valid.
Competition reduces the impact of talent
In the baseline model we assumed that  = 1 : This assumption implies that product market
competition aects the probability that low ability CEOs have of generating high revenue from
an innovation and that talent is more valuable in a competitive environment rather than in a
non-competitive environment. We now follow Aghion, Van Reenen and Zingales (2009) and
38assume that p = 1    and that  does not depend on : Notice that in this variant of the
model talent is more valuable when competition is less intense.
In this alternative setting the direct eect of overcondence on innovation is analogous to













Nevertheless, because talent is less valuable when competition is intense, the cross partial













Therefore the impact of overcondence on innovation is lower when  is large and the second
testable prediction of our baseline model no longer holds.
It is important to notice that, despite the negative cross partial derivative, this alternative
framework can still provide support to the idea that only overcondent CEOs innovate when
competition is intense. To see this let us x the level of innovation cost I. Notice that U(i =
1)   I > U(i = 0) as long as
p > b p(o) =
(2I   2w + )
(1 +  + o(1   ))
(1 + )
 
   w(1 + )

and that b p is decreasing in o. This implies that non overcondent CEOs will innovate only
if the level of product market competition is below 1   b p(0)  0. Therefore when   0
both overcondent and non-overcondent CEOs innovate whereas if  > 0 only overcondent
CEOs innovate.
39Appendix B: Additional Empirical Results
Table B1: Overcondence and Innovation (Conditional FEs)
Poisson Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Dependent Variable = Total Citations





Lerner Index 1.435 -1.141
(3.01) (2.49)
Lerner x Overconf -4.053**
(1.85)
Lerner x Holder67 -6.018**
(2.76)
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1678 1041 1678 1041
Firms 155 145 155 145
CEOs 212 201 212 201
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5%
signicance; ***1% signicance. Overcondence is the maximum value
for Holder67 for a given CEO where Holder67 is a dummy equal to 1
for all CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise an option 67% in the
money with 5 years remaining duration. Lerner Index is the median
gross prot margin of all Compustat rms in a 2-digit SIC code (see
text). CEO controls are Age, Age
2, Tenure and Tenure
2.
40Table B2: Overcondence and Innovation (CEO Switches)
Poisson Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Cite-Weighted Unweighted Cites per
Outcome Variable Patents Patents Patent
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Overcondence 0.443** 0.516*** 0.249 0.257* 0.354*** 0.247*
(0.20) (0.15) (0.17) (0.15) (0.13) (0.13)
Pre-Overconf x T 0.100 0.081 -0.072
(0.09) (0.09) (0.06)
Pre-Switch x T 0.024 0.013 0.029
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CEO Controls Yes No Yes No Yes No
Firm Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 560 280 560 280 560 280
Firms 52 28 52 28 52 28
CEOs 79 41 79 41 79 41
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% signicance; ***1% sig-
nicance. Overcondence is the maximum value for Holder67 for a given CEO where Holder67
is a dummy equal to 1 for all CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise an option 67% in the
money with 5 years remaining duration. Pre-Switch x T is a time-trend for the four year period
prior to a change in CEO for all rms. Pre-Overconf x T equals Pre-Switch x T multiplied an
indicator that equals one if the rm hires an Overcondent CEO.
41Table B3: Overcondent CEOs in Table B2
Company Name CEO Name Year Hired
1 ALCOA O'Neill Paul H. 1987
2 AMAX INC Born Allen 1986
3 AMERICAN BRANDS INC Alley William J. 1987
4 AT&T CO Allen Robert E. 1988
5 C B I INDUSTRIES INC Jones John E. 1989
6 CABOT CORP Bodman Samuel W. 1988
7 CATERPILLAR INC Fites Donald V. 1990
8 COLGATE PALMOLIVE CO Mark Reuben 1984
9 COORS ADOLPH CO Coors Jerey H. 1985
10 DEERE & CO Bechere Hans W. 1990
11 E G & G INC Kucharski John M. 1987
12 ENGELHARD CORP Smith Orin R. 1984
13 GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBR CO Mercer Robert E. 1983
14 GULF & WESTERN INDS INC Davis Martin S. 1983
15 HERSHEY FOODS CORP Zimmerman Richard A. 1984
16 INTEL CORP Grove Andrew S. 1987
17 INTERNATIONAL PAPER CO Georges John A. 1985
18 MEAD CORP Roberts Burnell R. 1981
19 MOTOROLA INC Fisher George M. C. 1988
20 NICOR INC Cline Richard G. 1986
21 P P G INDUSTRIES INC Sarni Vincent A. 1985
22 PACIFIC TELESIS GROUP Ginn Sam L. 1988
23 RORER GROUP INC Cawthorn Robert E. 1985
24 RYDER SYSTEMS INC Burns M. Anthony 1983
25 SEARS ROEBUCK & CO Brennan Edward A. 1986
26 TAMPAX INC Shutt Edwin H. 1982
27 TOSCO CORP O'Malley Thomas D. 1990
28 U S WEST INC McCormick Richard D. 1991
42Table B4: Overcondence and Innovation (Robustness Checks)
Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Dependent Variable = Total Cites
Specication Poisson Poisson Poisson NegBin
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Overcondence 0.241** 0.246** 0.063* 0.527***











Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC 2-digit Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Eects BGV BGV BGV BGV
Observations 2200 1491 2037 2411
Firms 207 153 206 227
CEOs 277 177 275 301
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% sig-
nicance; ***1% signicance. Overcondence is the maximum value for
Holder67 for a given CEO where Holder67 is a dummy equal to 1 for all
CEO years after the CEO fails to exercise an option 67% in the money
with 5 years remaining duration. BGV xed eects are based on includ-
ing pre-sample means of the dependent variable. All models control for




43Table B5: Overcondence and Innovation (ExecuComp Sample)
Poisson Panel Regressions
Unit of Observation = Firm-Year
Dependent Variable = Total Citations





Lerner50 x Holder67-EC -1.223***
(0.09)
Lerner50 x Overconf-EC -0.665**
(0.32)
Year Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
SIC 2-digit Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Eects BGV BGV BGV BGV
Observations 4799 7123 4799 7123
Firms 1245 1491 1245 1491
CEOs 1360 1674 1360 1674
Cluster robust standard errors in parentheses: *10% signicance; **5% signi-
cance; ***1% signicance. BGV xed eects are based on including pre-sample
means of the dependent variable. All models control for ln(R&D Stock), ln(Sales),
ln(Capital/Labor) and CEO Age, Age
2, Tenure and Tenure
2.
44